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ABSTRACT: In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue
that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral consideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. In
many ways it is more difficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic
animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are
more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to
whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are more
well studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolutionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those
that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data (‘science sense’) show clearly that many aquatic
organisms, much to some people’s surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain.
Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science for
understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential
to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. Lastly, I argue that
when we are uncertain if we are inflicting pain due to our incessant, annoying, and frequently unnecessary intrusions into the lives of other animals as we go about ‘redecorating nature’ (removing animals or moving them from place to place), we should err on the side of the animals and stop engaging in activities that cause pain and suffering.
KEY WORDS: Ethics · Cognitive ethology · Animal emotions · Animal protection · Animal welfare ·
Animal rights · Sentience · Animal pain · Animal suffering
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HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS: JUST WHO DO
WE THINK WE ARE?
At that point I was working with squid, and I think squid
are the most beautiful animals in the world. And it just
began to bother me. I began to have the feeling that
nothing I could find out was worth killing another squid.
(Ruth Hubbard, in Holloway 1995, p. 49)
The whale in the sea, like the wolf on land, constituted
not only a symbol of wildness but also a fulcrum for projecting attitudes of conquest and utilitarianism and,
eventually, more contemporary perceptions of preservation and protection.
(Kellert 1996, p. 112)

*Email: marc.bekoff@colorado.edu

Humans are a curious lot, and our intrusions, intentional and inadvertent, have significant impacts on
other people, nonhuman animal beings (‘animals’),
plants, water, the atmosphere, and inanimate landscapes. Often our influence is subtle and long-term.
There are many important and difficult issues that
demand serious consideration in discussions of the
ethics of how human beings interact with animals
(Bekoff & Jamieson 1991, 1996, Bekoff 1998). Their
complexity is compounded because highly charged
subjective personal opinions and passions run high as
one might expect. Furthermore, it is often challenging
and frustrating for us to confront ourselves when we
© Inter-Research 2007 · www.int-res.com
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see how destructive we are and how many other animal beings suffer and die because of what we do to
them, often intentionally. Frequently, we ignore scientific data that show that we are indeed causing enduring pain and suffering. Humans can also be an arrogant lot and it is humbling to ask with humility, rather
than with hubris, ‘Just who do we think we are?’
Pondering questions about the ethics of our interactions with other animals raises numerous ‘big’ questions, many of which we would rather ignore because
the answers are not all that easy or flattering. These
questions include: Who are we in the grand scheme of
things? What role does science (‘science sense’) play in
our understanding of the world in which we live? What
does it means to ‘know’ something? Are other minds
really all that private and inaccessible so as to make it
impossible to know what individuals are feeling? What
does the future hold in store if we continue to dismantle the only planet we live on and continue to persecute
the other animal beings with whom we are supposed to
coexist?
My essay highlights the complexity and multidimensionality of many issues that center on human ethical
obligations to other species. I will focus a good deal of
attention on the study of animal minds and what is in
them (cognitive ethology) and also consider some big
and difficult questions that arise when we consider
what is called the ‘human dimension’ and anthropogenic assaults on the lives of other animals. Because
of this, interdisciplinary discussion is mandatory and
this special issue of Diseases of Aquatic Organisms is a
much-welcomed and forward-looking addition to the
field. It is also good to see that Inter-Research (IR) and
and publishers of other journals have a stated ethical
requirement for papers that are published in these outlets concerning ‘the use of animals in research and/or
the sampling of endangered species.’ Professional
societies should set stringent guidelines for ethics, and
these standards should not be viewed as unnecessary
barriers to research or to curtailing the use of animals
for other human activities.
My essay is also meant to be a starting point for discussion of different perspectives. I lay out broad issues
and big questions to get the discussion going. Regardless of differences in opinion about what we owe other
species, it is important that we all agree that ethics is
an essential element in any discussion of human interactions with other animals (Nollman 1999, Bekoff
2000a, 2002b, 2006a,b, Goodall & Bekoff 2002). Scientists are human beings and we all have a point of view,
and open discussions in which different perspectives
are carefully and respectfully aired are sorely needed
in the area of animal protection, which includes different schools of thought, namely ‘animal welfare’ and
‘animal rights.’

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ANIMAL WELFARE: THE
MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS
The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?
(Bentham 2005, p. 283; first published 1789)

In current discussions about the moral status of animals, there is an obvious ‘progressive’ trend for greater
protection for wild and captive animals. This is clearly
the case for marine mammals (Kellert 1999) and let us
hope it will become the case for other aquatic animals
and animals in general. In a survey of American’s perception of marine mammals most respondents were
opposed to commercial whaling, often for ethical reasons. Concern was also expressed for the commercial
exploitation of seals, sea otters, walruses, and polar
bears. Most Americans also objected to commercial
whaling by native peoples or the resumption of killing
gray whales. A majority of Alaskans opposed oil and
gas development if it injured or killed marine mammals. There was also an unsuccessful effort prior to the
reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
in 1988 to prohibit any invasive research involving
marine mammals unless that research would directly
benefit the subject of the research.
In recent years, philosophers and scientists have
devoted increasing attention to questions about the
moral status of animals (Regan 1983, Singer 1990,
Francione 2000). Many people support a position
called the rights view. To say that an animal has a right
to have an interest protected means that the animal
has a claim, or entitlement, to have that interest protected even if it would benefit us to do otherwise (Francione 2000). Humans have an obligation to honor that
claim for other animals (just as they do for humans who
cannot protect their own interests). Thus, if a wild dolphin has a right to feed, then humans have an obligation to allow it to do so, and not do anything to interfere
with its feeding activities. Likewise, if a dolphin has a
right to life, it cannot be used in war games, actual
warfare, or other activities in which death is possible.
Animal rights advocates stress that animals’ lives are
valuable in and of themselves (they have inherent
value) and their lives are not valuable because of what
they can do for humans (their utility) or because they
look or behave like us. Animals are not property or
‘things,’ but rather they are living organisms worthy of
our compassion, respect, friendship, and support. Animals are not ‘lesser beings’ than or ‘not as valuable’ as
human beings; they are not property that can be
abused or dominated. Human benefits are irrelevant
for determining how animals should be treated.
Many people believe that the animal rights view
and the animal welfare view are identical, but they
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are not. Animal welfarists typically focus on an individual’s usefulness to humans. They practice utilitarianism, in which the general rule of thumb is
that the right actions are those that maximize utility
summed over all those who are affected by the
actions. Often welfarists/utilitarians are called ‘wiseusers.’ They believe that while humans should not
abuse or exploit animals, as long as we make the
animals’ lives comfortable, physically and psychologically, we are taking care of them and respecting
their welfare. Welfarists are concerned with the quality of animals’ lives. But, welfarists do not believe
that animals’ lives are valuable in and of themselves.
Many conservation biologists and environmentalists
are utilitarians who are willing to trade-off individuals’ lives for the perceived good of higher levels
of organization such as populations, species, or ecosystems.
The welfarists’ rule of thumb, and it is not a moral
rule, is that it is permissible to use animals if the relationship between the costs to the animals and the
benefits to the humans is such that the costs are less
than the benefits. Welfarists believe that if animals
experience comfort, appear happy, experience some
of life’s pleasures, and are free from prolonged or
intense pain, fear, hunger and other unpleasant
states, then we are fulfilling our obligations to them. If
individuals show normal growth and reproduction,
and are free from disease, injury, malnutrition, and
other types of pain and suffering, they are doing well.
Thus, welfarists argue that using animals in experiments, slaughtering them for human consumption,
and using them for treating human disorders (for
example, dolphin-assisted therapy programs) are permissible as long as these activities are conducted in a
humane way. Welfarists do not want animals to suffer
from any unnecessary pain, but they sometimes disagree among themselves about what pain is necessary and what humane care really is. Welfarists agree
that the pain and death animals experience is sometimes justified because of the benefits that humans
derive. The ends – human benefits – justify the means
– the use of animals. Some people argue that ‘smart’
animals suffer more than do less intelligent beings
and therefore it is easier to justify the use of invertebrates, fish, and various rodents rather than dogs,
cats, or great apes, for example. However, intelligence and suffering are not necessarily correlated
and clever animals do not suffer more than less clever
individuals (Bekoff 2006a, 2007). For the utilitarian
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, whose quote I began
this section with and whose lead many people follow,
it really did not much matter if animals could think or
if they were smart. Rather, Bentham was concerned
with whether or not animals could suffer.
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COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY, SCIENCE SENSE, AND
COMMON SENSE: ’MINDING ANIMALS’ THAT
ARE USUALLY NOT MINDED
Cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the
unifying science for understanding the subjective,
emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals
because it is essential to know what animals do, think,
and feel as they go about their daily routines in the
company of their friends and when they are alone
(Allen & Bekoff 1997, Bekoff 2002b, 2006a,b,c). It is
important to learn why both the similarities and differences in cognitive capacities and sentience between
humans and other animals have evolved. The more we
come to understand other animals the more we will
appreciate them as the amazing beings they are and
the more we will come to understand ourselves. We
must pay close attention to what animals do in their
worlds and recognize other animals as a ‘way of knowing.’ Scientific data, what I call ‘science sense’, is but
one way of knowing, and common sense, intuition, and
indigenous knowledge must be given serious consideration (Bekoff 2006a,b).
It is important to blend ‘science sense’ with common
sense. We also need to give serious consideration to
the question: What does it mean to ‘know’ something?
I maintain that we know that some nonhuman animals
feel something some of the time, just as do human animals. It is nonsense to claim that we do not know if
dogs or pigs or cows or chickens feel pain or have a
point of view about whether they like or do not like
being exposed to certain treatments. The same goes
for the live cats and dogs that are used as shark bait on
the island of Réunion (Mott 2005). Who are we kidding? Frankly, I think we’re kidding ourselves.
We also are quite good about making predictions
about what animals are likely to do and what they prefer and do not prefer when we make inferences about
their mental states and feelings (Bekoff 2006a). For
example, Wemelsfelder & Lawrence (2001) discovered
that even people who have little experience observing
animals usually agree with one another on what an
animal is most likely feeling. Their intuitions are borne
out because their characterizations of animal emotional states predict future behavior quite accurately.
In another study, Wemelsfelder and her colleagues
(Wemelsfelder et al. 2001) asked 18 naïve observers to
independently and in their own words describe the
behavioral expression of 20 pigs. They discovered that
the observers showed ‘significant agreement in their
spontaneous assessment …, which suggests that these
assessments were based on commonly perceived and
systematically applied criteria.’
Highly accurate prediction offers one of the
strongest arguments for the existence of emotions and
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feelings in nonhuman species. Predictive ability shows
that we often know a lot more than we give ourselves
credit for. When we think dogs are having fun, we predict that they will continue playing and seek it out with
other individuals if their play partner stops. When we
see an elephant moping, e.g. walking slowly and aimlessly, body low to the ground, trunk drooping, and tail
down, we are quite right about inferring that it is sad or
grieving. The emotional lives of many animals are not
hidden or private, but rather public.
Some will say, ‘Oh, you’re just being anthropomorphic.’ I am indeed. Among many researchers there is
less resistance to being ‘anthropomorphic’ because
most people – researchers and non-researchers alike –
realize that careful, biocentric anthropomorphism that
takes the animal’s point of view into account (Bekoff
2000b,c) is a very useful heuristic. I have argued
repeatedly that we must be anthropomorphic because
of who we are – anthropoid apes who use a spoken language to communicate our own feelings – and that sanitized reductionistic or mechanistic discussions of animal emotions and sentience are barren and do not help
us understand what other animals are feeling or thinking (for more detailed discussion of anthropomorphism, see Bekoff 2006a,b).

WHAT DO ANIMALS WANT?
Cognitive ethology can also help us gain insights
into what animals want (Carbone 2004) and it is safe to
say that they do not want to suffer, just as we do not
want to suffer. Surely a whimpering or playing dog, a
lone chimpanzee in a tiny barren and dark cage, an
elephant grieving the loss of a friend, or a baby pig
having its tail cut off – ‘docked’ as this horrific and
inexcusable procedure is called – or having its teeth
ground down on a grindstone, feels something. Recent
data show that chronic pain is associated with docking
(Bekoff, 2006b). Is this really surprising? Cows can be
moody, hold grudges and nurture close friendships,
and sheep prefer the faces of familiar individuals
(Bekoff 2006b). Is this really surprising? Animals are
not unfeeling objects.
Studies of animal preferences are replete with information that shows clearly that individuals make
choices that maximize reward and pleasure and minimize punishment and pain (Balcombe 2006, Bekoff
2006a, McMillan & Vance 2004). Animals clearly tell us
this in many ways and it is our responsibility to figure
out how they communicate their feelings to us. There
are data that indicate that reptiles, such as iguanas, try
to maximize sensory pleasure (Cabanac 1999, Ramirez
& Cabanac 2003). Iguanas choose to stay warm rather
than venture out into the cold to get food, whereas

amphibians such as frogs and fish do not show such
behavior. Cabanac (1999) postulated that the first mental event to emerge into consciousness was the ability
of an individual to experience the sensations of pleasure or displeasure (Ramirez & Cabanac 2003). Based
on Cabanac’s research, there is evidence that reptiles
experience basic emotional states, and that the ability
to have an emotional life emerged between amphibians and early reptiles. Now, what about aquatic
organisms for which there are few data?

ETHICS, SENTIENCE, AND AQUATIC ANIMALS:
DEALING WITH INNUMERABLE NAMELESS AND
FACELESS INDIVIDUALS
The emotional lives of fish and other aquatic organisms are difficult to study because the way in which
they might communicate their feelings is not readily
apparent to humans. Their emotions are not as public
as those of mammals, for example. This does not mean,
of course, that fish and other aquatic organisms do not
experience various emotions including pain and suffering. The faces of many aquatic animals are not very
expressive, but many fish and octopuses, for example,
change colors in different social contexts, and these
changes seem to be related to how they feel about the
situation in which they find themselves (Anderson
2000). When octopuses get angry, their pearly white
skin turns red. Anderson (2000), who studies octopuses
at the Seattle Aquarium, claims that octopuses wear
their hearts on their skin for all to see. A red octopus is
likely an angry octopus that should be avoided. There
are also various chemicals that are carried in water
that indicate stress, and fish that are exposed to these
chemicals swim away as if they are afraid (EiblEibesfeldt 1975).
For a variety of reasons, writing about the ethics of
dealing with many aquatic animals is much more difficult than writing about the terrestrial vertebrates,
social carnivores and various birds, with which I am
more familiar. Because of a lack of facial expression or
expressive eyes, it is more difficult for some people to
identify with, and to understand, the social lives, cognitive skills, emotional experiences, and types of suffering and pain that these animals endure in their
aquatic environs, habitats that are foreign to humans.
With this lack of ability to identify with individuals it
becomes more difficult to empathize with them, yet
empathy is critical in making decisions about what
other individuals are feeling (de Waal 2005, Bekoff
2006a,b) and how we should respond to them. Because
of our lack of familiarity with many aquatic animals,
we often find ourselves swimming upstream in muddy
water when we discuss our ethical obligations to them
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because it is easy to ignore what we cannot or do not
directly sense or feel. We make certain assumptions
and move on from there.
Many people also argue that for species for which
there are innumerable members we do not need to be
concerned with the well-being of individuals because
the species as a whole is not in trouble or endangered.
Furthermore, it is uncommon to name the animals they
are studying, especially when there are countless individuals present. Working with numerous nameless
individuals distances people from the animals they are
interacting with (Bekoff 2002b, 2006a). As exemplars
they discuss, for example, huge schools of fish, in
which there may be millions of nameless individuals.
However, just because there are millions of unnamed
animals does not mean we do not have a responsibility
to treat individuals with respect and to avoid subjecting them to painful experiences. When I mention fish
to some colleagues their response is often ‘Oh, there
are so many of them we don’t need to worry about individuals.’ It is perfectly okay with them if individuals
are traded off for the good of their species.
Another problem is that fish and other aquatic animals find themselves as meals for innumerable
humans across cultures, and since it is unlikely that the
world will ever become totally or even predominantly
vegetarian, aquatic food animals find themselves
being taken in massive and unsustainable quantities.
We are fishing down the food web, and lower levels of
the marine food chain are being used to sustain fish
farms. The Food and Agricultural Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) noted in February 2006
that their
… most recent global assessment of wild fish stocks
found that out of the almost 600 major commercial
species groups monitored by the Organization, 52% are
fully exploited while 25% are either overexploited
(17%), depleted (7%) or recovering from depletion (1%).
Twenty percent are moderately exploited, with just
three percent ranked as underexploited. Wider use of
fishing rights would help address not only overfishing
but also the problem of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing as well as conflicts over access to
fishing grounds …
(http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/
2006/1000239/index.html)

There are also problems with non-target species
being caught due to fishing activities. For example, in
1990, about 42 million marine mammals and sea birds
were caught in drift nets as squid and tuna were being
harvested (Fox 1997). About 129 000 Olive Ridley turtles have died over the past 13 yr because they suffocate in the nets of fishing boats not using mandatory
turtle-excluder devices. Experts fear that the movement of giant ships and artificial illumination will put
the turtles in even deeper trouble in the years ahead.
Whales also are non-target victims of fishing nets. In
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2003 the World Wildlife Fund reported that nearly
1000 whales, dolphins, and porpoises drowned daily
after becoming entangled in fishing nets and other
equipment (Verrengia 2003). Annually, more than
300 000 individuals may perish because of fishing
activities. And while a global moratorium on commercial whaling has existed since 1986, Japan and Iceland
continue to hunt as part of what they call ‘scientific
programs.’ Norway has objected to the moratorium
and runs commercial whaling operations.
So, while it may be more difficult to empathize with
a turtle, herring, crustacean, or lobster, they are heavily exploited and subjected to much harassment and
suffering at the hands of humans. The problems are no
less important, nor are our ethical obligations less compelling because these animals are so different from us
or from those species to which we readily grant moral
standing.
Our feelings for other animals figure heavily into the
sorts of treatment we deem permissible or impermissible. We view and treat different aquatic animals differently because of what we assume about them, and this
influences how we feel about them. Most people are
familiar with the phenomenal cognitive skills and sentience of animals such as cetaceans and other charismatic species, but it is only very recently that solid scientific information has been published about pain in
fish (Sneddon 2003, Moccia & Duncan 2004, Chandroo
et al. 2004a,b), pain and suffering in cephalopods and
decapod crustaceans (see Advocates for Animals
2005), and the impressive social skills, culture, sophisticated learning abilities, long-term memory, cooperative behavior, and recognition skills of fish (Bshary et
al. 2002; see also EFSA 2005 for a comprehensive summary of the biology, sentience, emotional lives, and
welfare of a wide variety of taxa including aquatic animals and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2005)
report on the ethics of research involving animals).
There is evidence that fish such as rainbow trout experience fear (Moccia & Duncan 2004) and that it is
entirely reasonable to assume that many fish are sentient and have the capacity to suffer (Chandroo et al.
2004a,b). Thus, Chandroo et al. (2004a) argue that the
concept of animal welfare can legitimately be applied
to fish. Octopus have been protected from invasive
experimental research in the United Kingdom under
The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 that was
amended in 1993 to include Octopus vulgaris
(http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1993/Uksi_19932103_en_
1.htm). Octopus are protected because of their large
brains and highly developed learning skills. This
amendment occurred years before a ban on invasive
research on chimpanzees was established in the
United Kingdom (1997), New Zealand (2000), and The
Netherlands (2002).
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Another popular food item also figures into the discussion of sentience. While it remains unknown if lobsters feel pain, one of the world’s experts on this matter, Jelle Atema, working at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute, notes, ‘While I do not know
for certain, I believe that lobsters may feel pain.’ (cited
in Corson 2004, p. 278) Further, Atema writes, ‘When
we kill them for food we should do so quickly. But we
should also honor them with thoughtful appreciation
for what they have done for us. I believe we should
strive for this in all corners of our lives.’ It is refreshing
to hear this from a practicing scientist.
It is important that we broaden our taxonomic perspective when we consider the pain and suffering that
we dole out. We need to ‘mind’ animals. The phrase
‘minding animals’ refers to caring for other animal
beings, respecting them for who they are, appreciating
their own world views, and wondering what and how
they feel and why. It also refers to the fact that many
animals have very active and thoughtful minds (Bekoff
2002a). We naturally ‘mind’ terrestrial and aquatic
habitats and they and all animals and people are far
better off than they would be in the absence of an ethic
that blends respect, caring, compassion, humility, generosity, kindness, grace, and love. It is obvious that
many animals have a point of view about their place in
the world and that the obvious answer to the question
‘Do you feel anything?’ is ‘Yes, I feel a lot.’ Numerous
aquatic animals typically are not ‘minded’ and we
need to reverse this trend.

ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES:
ANIMALS WILL ALWAYS HAVE SECRETS BUT
THEIR EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES ARE PUBLIC
My starting point concerning animal emotions and
sentience is that many animals have rich and deep
emotional lives and are clearly sentient. Their passions
are public and not well hidden. It is not a matter of
if emotions have evolved by why they evolved in a wide
variety of species. Many animals feel emotions such as
joy, happiness, fear, anger, grief, jealousy, resentment,
and embarrassment (Bekoff 2000c, 2002b, 2006a,b, de
Waal 2005, Panksepp 2005a,b; Wilhelm 2006; see
also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/ nature/44016
95.stm). Some might also have a sense of humor or even
a sense of awe. Some might even be moral beings who
know ‘right from ‘wrong’ (Bekoff 2004, 2006a). Perhaps
some animals marvel at their surroundings and just enjoy being out where they live. We really do not know
and should keep an open mind about these intriguing
possibilities when we cause pain and suffering. It is
likely that some people would choose alternative food
sources if they knew of the scientific data that showed

that fish and other aquatic organisms likely suffered as
do many terrestrial sources of food.
Charles Darwin’s idea of evolutionary continuity, in
which variations among species are differences in
degree rather than differences in kind, is very useful in
the study of animal intelligence, animal emotions, and
our ethical obligations to other animals. Basically, Darwin argued that there are shades of gray among different species and that the differences are not black and
white. So, if humans feel emotions and can suffer, then
so too can other animals, but their feelings are not necessarily identical. However, even if they are not identical, this does not mean that they do not exist. It is possible that fish and lobster pain is different from dog,
chimpanzee, or human pain, but each individual suffers his or her own pain.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS
In addition to broad claims about species differences,
we need to focus on individuals because all individuals
count. Caution surely is the best road to take when
offering generalizations, especially about complex
behavior patterns, animal thinking, and animal emotions across species. Large individual differences
within species mean that normative claims that ‘dolphins do this’ or ‘cuttlefish do that’ discount fascinating
individual variations that make the study of animal
behavior challenging and exciting. The phrase ‘the
dolphin’ is misleading and does not capture who these
amazing aquatic animals are. If we try to draw lines
concerning which species experience emotions and
experience pain and suffering, we need to be very
careful when we do it. Frankly, I think it is a waste of
time because new data are constantly adding species
to the list of those that do or most likely experience
pain and suffering. When new data are collected about
animal sentience, species that were previously
included before this information was available are
rarely removed from the list.
These list of species that suffer and feel pain usually
do not include aquatic animals other than those that
garner a lot of attention such as sharks, dolphins, and
whales. Most descriptions of dolphins and other
cetaceans picture them as highly intelligent and sentient, capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, with
remarkable social and cognitive skills. Indeed, dolphins
and other marine mammals seem to fulfill some criteria
of ‘personhood’ (Herzing & White 1998) in that they are
alive, aware of their surroundings, sentient, and may
have a sense of self. Why, then, do some people feel
comfortable intruding into their worlds if it will cause
pain and suffering? Frohoff (1998, p. 84) has poignantly
noted: “Currently we are walking a fine line in our rela-

Bekoff: Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics

tionship with cetaceans. The same attraction that motivates us to protect them from harm is also what drives
us to be close to them, to have them ‘within reach.’”
It is because dolphins and other marine mammals
are thought to be attractive, harmless, endowed with
mystical qualities, or to be of economic value as commodities for show or food, that we seek them out. However, we may bring much harm to them in our efforts to
include them in our lives, even in ways that do not
involve killing them. For example, ‘swim-with-dolphin’ and ‘petting pool’ programs remain very controversial. Such proffered reasons as ‘it’s fun,’ ‘aren’t the
animals cute,’ or ‘it’s a spiritual experience’ are insufficient to justify these practices. Much attention has
been given to the question of whether or not human
encounters with dolphins may have negative effects on
them. Human–dolphin interactions may be noisy and
stressful. The long-term effects of swim-with-dolphin
programs on dolphin behavior and well-being still
need to be studied systematically, but there is evidence
that the stress associated with these programs may
have long-term effects on the dolphins (for further discussion see Iannuzzi & Rowan 1991, Frohoff & Packard
1995, Samuels & Spradlin 1995, Marino & Lilienfeld
1998, Nathanson 1998, Basil & Matthews 2005, and
T. G. Frohoff unpubl.).

ARGUING AGAINST SPECIESISM AND FOR
EVOLUTIONARY CONTINUITY
I have stressed the degree to which perceived animal/
human differences in the brain’s organization of feeling
and emotion are probably due to artifacts rather than to a
real gap between primates (including humans) and other
mammalian orders. But that is not to say there is no real
difference at all between humans and other animals.
There may indeed be a real difference in brain organization of emotion. If so, however, it is quantitative in
nature and moderate in degree – not a qualitative or
massive difference.
(Berridge 2003, p. 41)
Neural substrates of feeling and emotion are distributed
throughout the brain, from front to back, and top to
bottom. The same brain structures are implicated in
affective reactions for both humans and other animals.
(Berridge 2003, p. 42)

Now, what about speciesism? Are we really the only
species in which emotions and the ability to suffer have
evolved. No. It is not a matter of ‘them’ versus ‘us.’
Over the years, a variety of criteria have been used to
separate them from us — tool use, language, culture,
rationality, consciousness, art, rationality, a sense of
self — and all have failed (Bekoff 2006a). Maybe we
are the only species that cooks food or in which sadism,
hatred, and evil have evolved. There are differences
but there are also many similarities between humans
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and non-human animals. Nonetheless, Dolan (2002)
claimed, ‘More than any other species, we are the beneficiaries and victims of a wealth of emotional experience.’ Professor Dolan cannot know that this statement
is true. Indeed, it just might be that other animals
experience more vivid emotions than we do. This sort
of speciesism – humanocentrism – is what plagues the
study of animal emotions. Why are we so special; why
are we such deeply feeling animals whereas other animals are not? I find it difficult to accept that we should
set the standard against which other animals should be
compared. Just look at the state of the world today.
My view of human–animal relations makes me
uneasy about claiming that any group of animals is
special. Unique yes, special no. I do not think that dolphins or whales are any more special than mice, great
tits, goldfish, lobsters, fish, alligators, shrimp, or ants.
Just because some animals are sentient, capable of
experiencing pain and pleasure, does not necessarily
mean that their lives should be valued more than
others. Neither is being cute or warm or furry and
cuddly a sufficient reason for special consideration and
moral standing. Often, people attribute various emotions and the capacity to suffer to charismatic animals
with whom they can identify and empathize (Bekoff
2006a). All life is valuable and all life should be
revered. Animals are not resources or property with
whom we can do what we please, their lives matter
very much, and they should be firmly entrenched in
our moral community (see Jamieson & Regan 1985
with respect to cetaceans).

WHAT SHOULD WE DO? DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
WITH NUANCED ANSWERS
Writing about animal ethics is bound to raise hackles
and bring one’s critics out of the woodwork. Many people are deeply passionate about the imbalance of
human–animal interactions–we get a lot and they get
very little. While some of my views are considered to
be ‘radical,’ especially by my ivory-tower colleagues, I
wonder why it is considered radical to argue that we
should let other animals be, and allow them to have
their own lives as much as is possible in this humandominated and anthropocentric world. I am confused,
for I am not trying to put my colleagues out of business
but rather to ask them to think more deeply about how
we impact the lives of other animals.
When many humans interact with nature, they usually wind up redecorating it. Intentionally or not, it is as
if humans have an inborn urge to reshape nature, to
expand their horizons. We just cannot stop ourselves,
and little else does, even the blatant results of our trying to dominate — manage, control — our surround-
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ings. We move animals around as we move furniture,
we redecorate landscapes with little concern for maintaining biological integrity, and we overfish and take
aquatic animals unsustainably. Even during strolls in
pristine forests, swims in oceans, or forays in the sky,
most humans are detached and alienated from the
majesty of their surroundings. They do not seem to
love nature deeply.
Because humans have incredible power to dominate
animals, they depend on our goodwill and mercy. Animals depend on humans to have their best interests in
mind. Human impacts on other animals, intentional
and inadvertent, are universal and ubiquitous. We are
here, there, and everywhere. A major question in need
of serious debate is should we ever interfere in other
animals’ lives – when might human interference be
permissible? Thus, should we let other animals be and
not intentionally interfere in their lives? Should we
hunt them for food whenever we so wish or should we
hunt only when there are no alternative food sources?
Should we interfere in other animals’ lives when we
have spoiled their habitats, when they are sick, provide food when there is not enough food to go around,
provide care to young if a parent does not, stop aggressive encounters, stop predators in their tracks, or relocate individuals from one place to another, including
zoos, wildlife and marine theme parks, and aquariums?
Should human interests always trump those of other
animals? If not, then when should the interests of other
animals trump our own?
Some of the basic principles that underlie the use
and exploitation of aquatic animals and some of the
general questions that need to be considered apply to
human encounters with just about all other species.
Definitive answers to these and other questions are
quite elusive, but open discussion can provide guidelines for proactive decision-making. All too often we
are left in the position of trying to rectify messy and difficult situations that we have created; proactivity needs
to become the modus operandi for future actions. For
many questions about how animals should be treated
by humans there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, but
rather nuanced decisions that need to take into
account the specific situation at hand.

ZOOS, AQUARIUMS, MARINE THEME PARKS,
AND THE WELL-BEING OF CAPTIVE ANIMALS
The existence of aquariums and marine theme parks
raises many important and difficult ethical questions
(Jamieson 1995, Rose & Farinato 1999, Davis 1997,
National Research Council). Jamieson argues that zoos
teach us a false sense of our place in the natural order.
Because what zoos teach us is false and dangerous,

both humans and animals will be better off when they
are abolished. Be that as it may, zoos are here to stay at
least in the short term, and we need to be sure that we
recognize their limitations and strive to offer their residents the best lives possible.
Kellert (1999) found that a majority of Americans
objected to the captive display of marine mammals in
zoos and aquariums if there are no demonstrated educational and scientific benefits.
There is little evidence that people leave zoos or
aquariums with any long-lasting sentiments or knowledge that benefit either the animals they have seen
or their wild relatives. Furthermore, few zoos are engaged in conservation efforts for marine mammals or
for any other animals. It is important to note that the
American Association of Zoos & Aquariums (AZA)
itself has concluded in their own executive summary
(AZA Executive Summary; http://www.aza.org/ConEd/
MIRP/Documents/VisitorLearningExecutiveSummary.
pdf) that ‘Little to no systematic research has been conducted on the impact of visits to zoos and aquariums on
visitor conservation knowledge, awareness, affect, or
behavior.’ So much for the AZA’s claims that zoos are
important for purposes of education and conservation.
Many questions center on how individuals are captured, transported, and kept in various types of captive
situations. Animals often are injured and otherwise
stressed during capture and transport. Family groups
may be broken up and the social structure of populations disrupted. The effects of changing the social
structure of wild populations are little known. Wellintentioned people often argue that the lives of captive
animals are of higher quality than those of wild relatives, but available data for marine mammals suggest
that this claim is not well supported (Rose & Farinato1999). From an ethical perspective, one must consider whether or not this claim is even relevant, for
keeping animals in captivity radically alters numerous
behavior patterns that have evolved over millennia.
Predation, starvation, and disease are part of what it is
to be wild. Is a longer unnatural life in captivity better
than a shorter natural life in the wild?
The benefits of keeping marine mammals and other
aquatic animals in captivity, to the animals themselves,
are largely unknown. Because the social and physical
environments of marine mammals are virtually impossible to replicate in captivity, ethical questions arise
when these animals are maintained in unnatural environments. There can be little doubt that the quality of
life is compromised, even though some zoo supporters
claim that their residents get free meals, protection
from predators, free health care, and a safe place to
sleep. In captivity, evolved patterns of foraging, care
giving, and migrating are lost as are natural patterns of
social organization (group size and composition). In
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captivity, for practical reasons, group sizes may be
much smaller than those observed in wild relatives.
Stereotyped behaviors often result from conditions of
captivity, as do self-mutilation and unusually high levels of aggression. Furthermore, individuals often cannot escape from the glaring eye of the public and they
cannot choose when and where to rest.
Many ethical concerns are also raised because first
and foremost, zoos are businesses and their bottom line
centers on money (Davis 1997). For example, it costs an
enormous amount of money to bring marine mammals
into captivity and to keep them there. It has been suggested that the money used to capture, transport, and
keep animals in captivity would be better used to do research in the wild. Also, much money is spent on public
relations and not on the animals themselves. Some feel
that the images of nature that are represented to the
public are a manufactured corporate point of view that
centers more on what the public wants than what is
good for the animals. Witness the existence of numerous ‘Flippers’ (the prototypical dolphin) and ‘Shamus’
(the model killer whale), whose lives do not resemble
even closely the lives of free-living conspecifics or relatives other than that they all live in water.
Similar questions are raised when considering
research on captive animals. Certainly, information
may be gathered about various aspects of their lives
(for example, maternal behavior, self-recognition,
social behavior, communication, and cognitive capacities). However, research on captive animals is increasingly being scrutinized by some researchers, philosophers, many universities, and various funding
agencies. Some relevant questions include: is it ever
permissible to keep individuals in captivity regardless
of their utility; is the knowledge that is gained by
studying captive individuals justified by keeping them
in cages or tanks; and could more reliable data be collected under more natural conditions? We still know
very little about the life histories of most aquatic animals. For many people it is the benefits that the captive
individuals and other members of their (or other) species might accrue that are central, not the benefits that
humans might gain. But rarely are the results of
research used to benefit the animals other than in
learning about medical treatments and husbandry to
make their lives in captivity better. Rarely do wild individuals benefit from work done on captive relatives.

THE FUTURE: BEING COMPASSIONATELY
PROACTIVE
Kellert’s (1999) study of American perceptions of
marine mammals and their management shows clearly
that most people support the various goals of the
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United States’ Marine Mammal Protection Act. Most
are willing to ‘render significant sacrifices to sustain
and enhance marine mammal populations and species
… These findings clearly indicate that marine mammals possess considerable aesthetic, scientific, and
moral support among the great majority of Americans
today.’ (Kellert 1999, p iv–v)
As a scientist, I am often criticized for being anti-science. This is not so. It is in the best traditions of science
to ask questions about ethics; it is not anti-science to
question what we do when we interact with other animals. Ethics can enrich our views of other animals in
their own worlds and in our different worlds, and help
us to see that their lives are worthy of respect, admiration, and appreciation. Indeed, it is out of respect,
admiration, and appreciation that many humans seek
out the company of whales, dolphins, polar bears, and
aquatic animals. The study of ethics can also broaden
the range of possible ways in which we interact with
other animals without compromising their lives. Ethical discussion can help us to see alternatives to past
actions that have disrespected other animals and, in
the end, have not served us or other animals well. In
this way, the study of ethics is enriching to other animals and to ourselves in that we may come to consider
new possibilities for how we interact with other animals. If we think ethical considerations are stifling and
create unnecessary hurdles over which we must jump
in order to get done what we want to get done, then we
will lose rich opportunities to learn more about other
animals and also ourselves. Our greatest discoveries
come when our ethical relationships with other animals are respectful and not exploitive.
Many ethical issues are extremely difficult to reconcile and generate highly charged and deeply emotional and passionate responses. Achieving a win–win
situation for animals and humans will be very difficult. However, it is clear that the increasingly detailed attention being given to various sorts of
human–animal interactions is showing that there are
innumerable negative effects on the lives of the animals. While many negative influences have been
anticipated or are not surprising, the severity of
human influences has not been fully appreciated. We
must be careful not to love these animals to their
(or our) deaths. Humans are indeed dangerous to
innumerable aquatic animals.
Allowing human interests always to trump the interests of other animals is not the best strategy if we are
to solve the numerous and complex problems at hand.
We need to learn as much as we can about the lives of
wild animals. Our ethical obligations also require us to
learn about the ways in which we influence animals’
lives when we study them in the wild and in captivity,
and what effects captivity has on them. As we learn
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more about how we influence other animals, we will
be able to adopt proactive, rather than reactive,
strategies.
The fragility of the natural order requires that people
work harmoniously so as not to destroy nature’s wholeness, goodness, and generosity. The separation of ‘us’
(humans) from ‘them’ (other animals) engenders a
false dichotomy, the result of which is a distancing that
erodes, rather than enriches, the numerous possible
relationships that can develop among all animal life.
Public education is critical. To disseminate information about what is called the ‘human dimension,’
administrators of zoos, wildlife theme parks, aquariums, and areas where animals roam freely should
inform visitors of how they may influence the behavior
of animals they want to see. Tourism companies,
nature clubs and societies, and schools can do the
same. By treading lightly humans can enjoy the company of other animals without making them pay for our
interest in their fascinating lives. Our curiosity about
other animals need not harm them.
Numerous aquatic animals are closely linked to the
wholeness of many ecosystems, and how they fare is
tightly associated with the integrity of communities
and ecosystems. By paying close attention to what we
do to them, why we do what we do, and where and
when we do it, we can help maintain the health of individuals, species, populations, and ecosystems.

TOWARD A DEEP ETHOLOGY: AQUATIC
ANIMALS ARE MORE THAN STREAMS
OF PROTEIN
We need a compassionate ethic of caring and sharing
our planet. Sensitivity and humility are essential components of our guiding ethic. Expanding our circle of
respect and understanding can help bring us all
together. We are other animals’ guardians and we owe
them unconditional compassion, respect, support, and
love. We may have control and dominion over other
animals, but this does not mean that we have to exploit
and dominate them.
My views on animal use are indeed restrictive. We
are not nature’s keepers if this means that we ‘keep
nature’ by dominating other animals using a narrow
anthropocentric agenda in which other animals are
objectified – referred to by numbers and not by names,
transformed into points on a graph – and their world
views discounted. This means that fish farms and capture fisheries (and slaughterhouses for terrestrial food),
for example, are not acceptable practices for producing
food. There is little doubt that fish suffer (e.g. Lambooij
et al. 2004, Moccia & Duncan 2004, Chandroo et al.
2004a,b).

The ethical problems with fish farms and aquaculture go beyond the harming of individuals. There also
are serious environmental concerns (McCarthy 2002,
Midkiff 2004). For example, farm-raised salmon have
escaped from their pens and this has led to crossbreeding and competition with native Pacific salmon.
There are dead zones under pens, as feces, excess
food, and harmful additives accumulate on the sea
floor. The state of Maine has banned salmon pens from
its offshore waters and Alaska has banned salmon
pens from its waters to protect native stocks and the
Alaska fishing industry (Midkillf 2004).
I know there is a real world out there and that the
world is not going to become vegetarian any time soon,
if ever. However, if we carefully scrutinize what we do
we surely can reduce the intentional harm we cause
billions of individuals as they become our meals. Fish
and other aquatic animals are more than streams of
protein.
So, where to from here? Our starting point should be
that we will not intrude on other animals’ lives unless
we can show that we have a right to override this
maxim and that our actions are in the best interests of
the animals irrespective of our desires. When unsure
about how we influence the lives of other animals, we
should give them the benefit of the doubt and err on
the side of the animals. It is better to be safe than sorry.
First and foremost in any deliberations about other
animals must be deep concern and respect for their
lives and the worlds within which they live, i.e. respect
for who they are in their worlds, and not respect motivated by who we want them to be in our anthropocentric scheme of things. As Taylor (1986, p. 313) notes, a
switch away from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, in
which human superiority comes under critical scrutiny,
‘may require a profound moral reorientation.’ That is
just fine. Can we really believe that we are the only
species with feelings, beliefs, desires, goals, expectations, the ability to think, the ability to think about
things, the ability to feel pain, or the capacity to suffer?
Surprises are always forthcoming concerning the
cognitive skills, emotional lives, and sentience of nonhuman animals, and it is essential that people who
write about animal issues be cognizant of these findings. I do not see how any coherent thoughts about
moral and ethical aspects of animal use could be put
forth without using biological/evolutionary, ethological, and philosophical information. Ethologists must
read philosophy and philosophers must not only read
ethology but also watch animals. And those who use
animals would do well to read about ethics and look for
more humane alternatives to the practices in which
they engage.
I believe that a deep reflective ethology is needed to
make people more aware of what they do to non-
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humans and to make them aware of their moral and
ethical obligations to animals. I use the term deep
reflective ethology to convey some of the same general
ideas that underlie the ‘deep ecology’ movement
(Tobias 1985), which asks people to recognize that not
only are they an integral part of nature but also that
they have unique responsibilities to nature.
Ethics, compassion, humility, respect, coexistence,
and sustainability are among the principles that
should guide us when we interact with other animals.
In most cases there are more humane alternatives
than the methods that we use to intrude into animals’
lives. We must step lightly into the lives of animals
and into their homes. We must not leave destructive
footprints of any size.
We can always do better in our interactions with
other animal beings. Always.
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